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The other major challenge to FM(C)T verification would be the possibility of undeclared production of HEU or plutonium. The same challenge exists under the NPT. Since the discovery of Iraq's undeclared enrichment program in 1991, the IAEA's capabilities to detect undeclared activities have been strengthened in those states that have ratified versions of the 1997 Model Additional Protocol.[20] This protocol requires a country to declare all of its nuclear-related activities, including, for example, centrifuge research and development and manufacture, and allows the IAEA access to check on the declaration's "correctness and completeness." From mid-July 2003 until February 2006, while Iran was complying voluntarily with the protocol, the IAEA successfully used the access that it provided to surface activities that Iran had tried to conceal, such as its enrichment experiments at the Kalaye Electric Company.[21]
Solving the North Korean problem, however, is much more difficult now than eight years ago when the last presidential transition took place. After quadrupling its fissile material stockpile, conducting its first nuclear test, building new missiles, and withdrawing from the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Pyongyang has embarked on a gambit to secure better relations with Washington while holding on to its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, that objective seemed feasible to Pyongyang even before the recent U.S. deal with India that essentially traded acceptance of India's nuclear status for better relations. Pyongyang seeks to trade the aging Yongbyon plutonium-production facility for normal relations while constructing a diplomatic firewall around its nuclear weapons stockpile by insisting on an end to "hostile relations" between the U.S. and North Korea before denuclearization. That strategy is becoming even more painfully apparent with the North's recent statements that begin to sketch out a new path into the future-that if hostile relations are not ended, its nuclear disarmament will be tied to the disarmament of other nuclear powers in the six-party talks-as well as the need for the verifiable end to the U.S. nuclear umbrella protecting South Korea and reciprocity in ensuring South Korea is denuclearized as well.
The third key component of a new U.S. policy will be to launch a diplomatic offensive designed to crack the denuclearization nut. That will require using process and substance in new ways to advance U.S. interests while signaling to Pyongyang a willingness to address its political, security and economic concerns. Washington should not hesitate to deal directly with Pyongyang at whatever level is necessary, ranging from special envoys to the president. That does not mean rushing off to high-level encounters, but it does mean being ready to deploy the diplomatic card with maximum effect to move negotiations forward. A meeting between leaders, which will be a clear sign of Washington's peaceful intentions, should be possible but only under carefully orchestrated circumstances where significant progress has been made in demonstrating that Pyongyang is willing to move toward giving up its nuclear arsenal. Even with accelerated bilateral contacts, the six-party talks should continue as an important mechanism to build multilateral support for the denuclearization push.
As to the idea of converting nuclear strategic weapons into conventional weapons, we are very much concerned about this concept. We don't believe that, so far, that there is a mechanism that would ensure that it would not be destabilizing. We have been told that this conversion of strategic delivery vehicles into non-nuclear ones would not affect Russian security, but that's easily said. It is difficult to understand how it could be guaranteed; how one can be relaxed about a number of delivery vehicles that can be reconverted at any time, and secondly can have strategic missions. So, we do not agree in principle because we do not know of any guarantees that it is not going to be threatening to our security. ACT: To date, U.S. and Russian arms control treaties have focused on strategic weapons. Yet, many analysts outside Russia have raised concerns about the size and security of Russia's stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as whether Russia has fulfilled past commitments to reduce these weapons.[8] Under what conditions would Russia be willing to provide a full accounting of these systems and start verifiably disposing of themKislyak: First and foremost, on the security of these weapons, this issue has been talked about many times. In my opinion, having been involved in negotiations, I do not know of a single case where there has been a real problem with the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons. 153554b96e
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